Concise Encyclopedia
of Comparative Sociology

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BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2014

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The Sociology of Religion

William D'Antonio and Anthony J. Pogorelc

The sociology of religion is rooted in the writings of the founders of sociology, beginning with Comte in the 19th century, and continuing with Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Marx. Much of 20th century sociology of religion was devoted to building on, critiquing, and eventually rethinking key aspects of their writings in the face of a worldwide revitalization of religion in the second half of the century.

In distinct but related ways, Durkheim, Weber, and Marx explained the rise and decline of religion in the face of dynamic changes spanning the 17th through 19th centuries. They critiqued urbanization and industrialization, and predicted that the rationalization of social life that emerged from the enlightenment would precipitate the decline of the public influence of religion. Casanova (1994, 15) summarized this movement:

> If before, it was the religious realm which appeared to be the all-encompassing reality within which the secular realm found its proper place, now the secular sphere will be the all-encompassing reality, to which the religious sphere will have to adapt.

As the 20th century began, an explosion of knowledge both challenged religious institutions and planted the seeds for social movements which revitalized them. The expansion of travel and communication led to an awareness of formidable non-Christian religions and global religious pluralism. Some scholars of religion embraced methods developed in the sciences to analyze and critique biblical texts, trading traditional, sacred vocabularies for analytical ones. The liberalism of these biblical scholars was countered by the mobilization of those who coalesced around what they termed the fundamentals of religion.

In this essay we will examine the sociology of religion in the context of a globalizing world. Social scientists recognize now that the study of religion extends beyond personal beliefs and private practices. Nevertheless, the latter continue to be important and are the subject of systematic research at the micro level, often with broad implications at the macro level. Globalization has made scholars, political and corporate leaders, aware of the power of religion on a world scale.

We begin with a brief review of the major methodological and theoretical tools passed on by Durkheim, Weber, and Marx which remain relevant. The foundation for the modern sociology of religion was developed by Durkheim who reasoned that religion was a universal social phenomenon that deserved scientific study. He separated "the question of the truth of religion from that of its structures and social functions, thus laying the basis for a structural-functionalist analysis in anthropology and sociology" (Casanova 1994). The religious worldview created a "unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things" (Durkheim 1915, 62) and articulated an ordered relationship between sacred and secular. Rites flowed from beliefs and prescribed proper conduct, which formed individuals into moral communities, something common to churches, temples, mosques, and other religious centers. Durkheim's (1951) early empirical research explained individual behaviors through the lens of social facts. For example, he analyzed the relationship between membership in different religious denominations and rates of suicide. His early works became a model for the study of how social factors influence a variety of individual-level behaviors.

Weber's theoretical and substantive contributions are manifold. His major theoretical contributions are found in what has come to be recognized as his most important though never fully completed work, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (1964). This volume included his analysis of the rationality of economic action, of monetary accounting, and the rationality of a money economy. He identified three types of legitimate authority (traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational), and illustrated their durability in the face of history either promoting or impeding social change. As a direct challenge to Marx's strictly economic view of social inequality, Weber developed a tripartite theory of social stratification based on class, status, and power.

Casanova (1994) noted that as Weber focused on the diverse meanings of religion, and their social-historical conditions and effects, he established the foundations for a comparative, historical, and phenomenological sociology of religion. The

most elementary forms of religious behavior were motivated by rational factors that should not be set apart from the range of daily, purposive activities (Weber 1964). Weber's best known work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1958) has been critiqued widely by social scientists across disciplines, but continues to be cited and read as a classic study of the relationship between religion, the economy, and the socio-cultural environment. He demonstrated how the ideas, values, beliefs and social structures of certain forms of ascetic Protestantism, by focusing the believer's energy on productive activities for their own sake, rather than for wealth or consumption, generated modern capitalism by bringing about a dramatic change in economic behavior, Weber further showed how the ideas, values, and beliefs of other religions such as Judaism, Catholicism, and Hinduism could not germinate into modern capitalism.

Weber projected that the triumph of ideas, values, and beliefs of the Enlightenment would precipitate the rationalization of social life and ultimately lead to the privatization and decline of religion as a significant factor in the public sphere. Yet as the 20th century ended and the 21st took its place, religion reasserted itself as a public force. Religious leaders as varied as Pope John Paul II, the Dalai Lama, the Iranian Imam Khomeini, and The Reverend Jerry Falwell have influenced the private and public, micro and macro spheres. Terrorist groups such as *Al-Qaida* have disrupted the international social order claiming religious motives (Juergensmeyer 2000). Thus, by the end of the 20th century, though often critiqued, Weber was still relevant, as social scientists struggled to come to grips with a new social reality, one in which Weber's theory of authority (charismatic, traditional, and legal-rational) could become quite helpful in trying to understand the turmoil within Roman Catholicism, Islam, Judaism and Evangelical Protestantism.

Marx claimed that economic forces, not beliefs, values, and culture, were the agents of change. Religion was a by-product of other processes, an epiphenomenon. It performed necessary functions, such as the expression of human distress, but in misguided ways. For example religion expressed the alienation resulting from capitalist exploitation, yet it concealed its origins while providing a narcotic that repressed revolutionary energies. Religion stifled movements for social change by legitimating the authority of the dominant class. Marx's emphasis on class conflict has found its way into studies on the relationship of religion with class and status especially in Latin American countries (Palacios 2007).

Secularization and Beyond: Sociology of Religion in the 20th and 21st centuries

The founders of sociology, in their treatment of religion, laid the path for the theory of secularization. A product of the Enlightenment, secularization viewed religious adherence as a hallmark of the unenlightened and predicted its eventual demise (Sherkat 1999). For a time, it became the hegemonic paradigm by which sociologists approached religion.

If one reviews the programs of the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association (ASA), the quadrennial meetings of the International Sociological Association (ISA), and the bi-annual meetings of the International Institute of Sociology (IIS) one can see that in nearly sixty years (1950 to 2009) only one Plenary Session featured the Sociology of Religion (IIS 1995). At the 1999 IIS meeting in Tel Aviv, Eickelman (2001, 93–103) openly challenged his colleagues: "The secular bias of modernization theory has had a significant role in deflecting attention away from the role of religious practices and values in contemporary societies, particularly in the Muslim majority world." Significantly, he contrasted the actual beliefs and behavior of Islamic leaders with the doomsday predictions of Western scholars. With Warner (1993), who proposed a "new paradigm", considering the operation of religion in the USA as an open market, he has led the way in gaining a new respect for the relevance of a sociology of religion in a globalizing world.

Because knowledge is formed in particular times and places, scholars in different locations will adopt different views of the same subject. The Enlightenment and sociology itself originated in a European paradigm, and secularization reflects the attitudes of most European countries. The Constitution of the European Union neglects to mention Europe's Christian history, the art and architecture, literature and music dedicated to a Christian God. On the other hand, the United States, India, and most nations with large Islamic populations are characterized by an interrelationship of religion and secularity, with important and

distinct differences in their political and economic systems. A variety of terms have been developed to characterize the differences.

The term Modernity was used to describe and explain the kind of world in which religion was only one among several social institutions constituting a particular state or society, and in which it had lost its privileged place as the ultimate source of law in a given state or society. The sign of modernity was the separation of religion from the power of the state. European countries with their royal families and state-supported churches, but with real power located in the government, and a highly secularized population, were seen as the prototype of the modern society. Yet recent research reveals that modern democratic societies display significant differences in the roles played by religion in public affairs. (Eisenstadt 2001).

The concept "multiple modernities" implies that modernity is not uniform but varies across societies and is affected by such factors as culture as well as time and space (Davie 2004). Some scholars claim that societies are modern or modernizing to the degree they are freeing themselves from traditional religions and their absolutist world view (Ben-Rafael and Sternberg 2001). Others claim that religiosity can be strong in society even where there is not a cohesive, dominant religion, but instead (like in the United States) there is a complex variety of religious sects, churches, and belief systems, embracing both rationality and emotions, and containing interpretive communities in which ideas and beliefs are contested (Dillon 2010). Meanwhile, multiculturalism has emerged in modern and democratic societies where alternative sources of meaning and moral authority are acknowledged as legitimate, and racial, ethnic and religious pluralism are recognized as the new normal.

While some suggest that we are on the verge of "a homogenization of history and culture" akin to "McWorld", a term that reminds one of Ritzer's "McDonaldization" (2000), which represents the culmination of Weber's theory of rationalization, others predict a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996) leading to a retreat into opposing traditionalist, fundamentalist, anti-modern movements.

Religious fundamentalism remains a fact in all major religions. Fundamentalists see pluralism as a problem, claim their beliefs and practices are exclusively true and seek to deny civil rights to those who do not observe their codes. Muqtedar

Khan (2003) outlined the Globalization of Wahabism in Islam. Barber (1995) discussed the integration of fundamentalism and rationalization. In *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1995) he argued that "Jihad" is not the antithesis of McWorld. Rather, Jihad can coalesce with the extreme rationalization of "McWorld", in which markets create a virtual world oriented not toward people but objects, and adopt a social psychology in which individual self-determination and consumption replace communal identity and belonging. Neither Jihad nor McWorld care about democracy, nor the concerns of citizens, such as full employment, social justice, wealth and education. Interlocked in a symbiotic relationship they represent fundamentalism and rationalization in service of belief or consumption with the individual carrying them to extremes.

In reaction to what is perceived as a blurring of boundaries, some groups strongly assert their particular religious identities in opposition to others (Ben-Rafael and Sternberg 2001). These characteristics are displayed in Hadden's (2000) portrayal of Jerry Falwell's fundamentalist Moral Majority. In the mid 1970s President Carter had sought to develop a wide consensus concerning public policy on the family. Rather than engaging in a dialogue, the Moral Majority claimed hegemony over the family, framing departures from the traditional nuclear family as the attack of secular forces, such as the media and the public education system, on the sacred family. Ironically, the Moral Majority, representing the symbiosis of fundamentalism and rationalization, used the media to help create its image as an unstoppable force. Inglehart and Baker (2000) portray fundamentalist values as survival values which can exist in either religious or secular forms as ideology. Extreme forms of religious fundamentalism, linked with nationalism and patriotism, are the products of concerns about survival.

A Complex Perspective on Secularization

Chaves (1994) described secularization as the process by which claims based in religious authority are questioned and challenged. Thus, individuals now increasingly face the problems of daily life by drawing on reason, lived experience, and empirical evidence rather than on religious dogmas or traditions. Even in societies where religious affiliation was not declining, such as the USA, religious leaders found their claims to authority increasingly challenged on personal and social issues.

Recent research shows that the locus of authority has been moving toward individual autonomy and that individuals are the arbiters of how much authority is conferred on religious hierarchs (Pogorelc and Davidson 2000; D'Antonio *et al.* 2007). For example, even in Italy, the Pope's religious doctrines on contraception are widely ignored. Weber's (1947) typology of authority (traditional, charismatic, and legal rational) enables researchers to track changes in religious beliefs and in the structural locus of moral authority across time and generations.

Sociology of religion seeks to discover and explain the patterns of social living associated with religion in its diverse forms. The changing global situation makes it difficult to ignore religion in the modern world or to claim that it is simply an epiphenomenon (Davie 2004). Habermas (2008) suggested that we are moving into a post-secular society in which the expectation of religion's disappearance from the public sphere has greatly diminished. He has even referred to the social benefits of religion's norms. In *A Secular Age* (2007) philosopher Charles Taylor argues that religious beliefs remain an option that exists in tension with secular beliefs.

Inglehart and Baker (2000) suggest that the secularization thesis was suited to the transition from an agrarian to an industrial phase, but that the persistence of religion and its role in the search for meaning in post-industrial societies bears a greater complexity than the secularization thesis can provide. Though there is a decline in authoritarian religious institutions, people are still concerned with spiritual matters. In fact, people in post-industrialized societies are more likely to devote themselves to thinking about the meaning and purpose of life.

New religious movements have developed in response to these changes in religion. These religiously-inspired social movements seek to reform states, organizations or individuals (Mellucci 1985, 1989; Touraine 1985). They develop cultures consisting of symbols, beliefs, rituals, outlooks, language and narratives that shape their construction of strategies of action (Swidler 1986). Movement cultures are influenced by the larger communities in which they are embedded (Wood 1999).

For example, the Emerging Church Movement describes itself as a loosely organized, social network-dependent initiative to revitalize Christianity for the contemporary world. One of its expressed goals is to liberate Christianity from fundamentalist-tinged orientations and from entanglements with modernity, bureaucracy and right wing politics. In worship it wants to bridge the traditions of the centuries. The Emerging Church takes a softer stance on doctrine and has a greater concern for social justice. It gathers in small, informal, and non-hierarchical assemblies and welcomes young adults into roles of leadership. Its goal is to create a "new normal" for a younger generation of Christians. In *American Grace* (2010) Putnam and Campbell suggest that many young adults associate being religious with being a member of the right wing; this contributes to one in four being unaffiliated with any religious body.

Princeton Professor Robert Wuthnow has written about the dynamism of religious consciousness and in some of his early work suggested that the young might be more attracted by new religious movements than by mainline churches. In *The Restructuring of American Religion* (1988), he examined the influence of the broader social environment on changing religious boundaries. He suggested that formal denominationalism was declining and being replaced by a more movement-oriented approach to religion focused on social interests.

In *After the Baby Boomers* (2007), Wuthnow considered demographic factors such as increased longevity and how they have contributed to the deferment of marriage and the bearing and raising of children, tasks traditionally associated with the achievement of adulthood among younger adults. He suggested this deferment has contributed to the decline of church attendance.

New research has reported that people's religious beliefs and practices no longer fit neatly into conventional categories, if they ever did. A poll by the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life (2010) found that large numbers of Americans engage in multiple religious practices, mixing elements of diverse traditions. Adults between the ages of 18 and 29 exceed the national norm in registering beliefs in reincarnation, spiritual energy, astrology, and "the evil eye" as well as in the practice of yoga. Twenty eight percent claim to have had spiritual experiences of being in touch with the dead, 20 percent have encountered ghosts. However, they are less likely to claim to have had a mystical experience, or to attend religious services on a regular basis. Wuthnow (2007) characterized the young as a generation

of tinkerers. This means they are very resourceful and have the capacity to construct a life from whatever skill sets, ideas and resources are readily at hand. They do not adopt a single way of doing things but improvise and piece things together from here and there. Because they have become accustomed to an uncertain environment, they do not depend on conventional and standard solutions for problems.

This Pew Report highlights a contrast that many Americans draw between being spiritual and being religious. Theologian Luke Timothy Johnson (2010) refers to this as the difference between *esoteric* religion, which finds the heart of religion in inner experiences or mysticism and *exoteric* religion, which focuses on external expressions of religions such as the observance of feasts and public rituals. In its desire for common expressions of beliefs and practices, exoteric religion strives to exert influence in the public sphere by shaping society according to its laws. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are exoteric traditions with strong elements of the esoteric in them and these two elements coexist in tension with each other. Johnson claims that when a religious tradition suppresses the esoteric, it becomes an instrument of social control and a form of politics making itself vulnerable to secular challenges because it loses the spiritual character that animates it.

D'Antonio and Hoge (2006), Hadden (2000), Warner (1993), Hammond (1992) and others have pointed to the disestablishment of religion in the USA as an example of how a society may foster strong ties to a wide range of religions while also becoming secular in many ways. Finke and Stark (1992) in their pioneer work *The Churching of America* argued that this created a religious marketplace in which religions competed with one another for congregants. The decline in religion elsewhere in the western world was more a function of the fact that unlike the United States, most of the Western European countries had religious monopolies, a privileged state religion, such as Anglicanism in England, Catholicism in Italy and Spain, and Lutheranism in the Scandinavian countries. The millions who did not expressly break from the state religion retained only the religious rituals associated with birth, marriage, and death. In these countries, the secularization process spurred on by science and technology was not being contested by religions competing in the marketplace.

In the 20th century, while the USA was becoming the world's most modern and innovative society in technology and business, church attendance was also growing. Some would claim that the rationalization of life should be accompanied by the decline of religion. Yet around this time, a growing number of sociologists were researching a wider range of topics, using the expanding methodological and theoretical skills of the discipline. Some raised questions about religion that secularization theory could not satisfy. Eventually, Warner (1993) documented what he called the paradigm shift, and along with scholars like Eickleman, we have moved to an awareness of the importance of religion—in both belief and actions—in this globalizing world.

In contrast to the previous sixty years, the XVIIth International Sociological Association World Congress of Sociology, held at Gothenburg, Sweden in July, 2010, featured religion as one of the five Plenary Themes presented in parallel daily sessions on each of the five days.

The five themes were: (1) Violence and war; (2) Sustainability; (3) Worlds of difference; (4) Action and imagination; and (5) Religion and power.

The rationale for the plenary sessions on religion stated:

> For a long time most social scientists—and not only they—have believed that secularization is a necessary corollary of modernization processes. In the last two decades, however, this (often tacit) assumption has been challenged very forcefully. Religious revitalization in several parts of the world, new forms of the instrumentalization of religion by political power, but also the religious inspiration of social movements against oppression have become crucial topics of social research and social theory. Moreover, this rethinking of 'religion and power' throws new light on the history of secularization and on current religious trends in a global perspective. (ISA 2010)

Another sign of the globalizing of the sociology of religion is found in Cipriani's essay on research associations and centers (2009: 523–531). He reported there were 17 scholarly associations worldwide now engaged in the study of religion. While the majority are located in the United States, there are also associations in Canada, England, Italy, France, and Central and Eastern Europe. Membership is increasingly cross-national.

Cipriani also reported the existence of 40 major research centers worldwide that focus attention on religion in society and culture. While almost

half are found in the United States, there are also important centers in Rome, Paris, Brussels, London, Cairo, and Rabat. A new entry not listed by Cipriani is the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, with its headquarters in Washington DC. In 2009 it published a major study on "Global Restrictions on Religion". It also completed a survey of 19 nations in Sub-Saharan Africa; this demographic work included a report titled "Mapping the Global Muslim Population" (The Pew Forum 2009).

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion" (Article 18). Yet the Pew study found that nearly 70 percent of the world's 6.8 billion people live in countries that restrict religion. Religious minorities frequently are the object of such restrictions. Restrictions on religion can be classified in two types. The first, government restrictions, refers to the extent to which government tries to control or limit the exercise of religion. The second, social restrictions, refers to acts of intimidation or violence by individuals, organizations or social groups. One third of the countries of the world have high or very high restrictions on religion (Pew 2009).

The Pew Forum's work is closely related to the question of how countries with large Muslim populations have understood the nature of law. These countries range along a continuum from those in which Islamic Law is the law of the land to those that privilege Islam but allow the active presence of other religions, to those that approach Western society in not favoring any religion, but recognizing the right to worship in private and public. How do these countries reflect modernization, cultural pluralism, and related models? And how do they interact in a world that offers the benefits and banes of modern science to those who would embrace the values of the Enlightenment?

The World Values Survey, which emerged from the European Values Study, has studied more than 80 societies in four waves of representative national surveys since 1981. It has found that economic development is associated with a turn from absolute norms and values toward those that are increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting and participatory. However, the cultural heritage of a society imprints values in a way that endures despite modernization.

The Survey constructs ideal types in the Weberian sense. The opposing points on the continuum are stated as 1) traditional versus secular-rational orientations toward authority, and 2) authoritarian-patriarchal versus self-expression values. The traditional orientation affirms authoritarian-patriarchal values focused on survival. The secular-rational orientation affirms self-expressive values that focus on life beyond the fear of tenuous survival, promoting diversity and creativity.

In *Culture Wars* (1991) Hunter described differences between two visions of the good society. One he called the Orthodox the other he called the Progressivist. The Orthodox adopts a literalist interpretation of the Bible and the norms it proclaims. Marty and Appleby (1991) note that fundamentalists of this type reject a scientific worldview, but embrace the technologies produced by this worldview. Fundamentalist Muslims are portrayed as having a similar worldview (see Barber 1995).

The Progressivist views the world as a product of evolution. Human beings are distinguished by the gift of reason and challenged to search for truths, using reason, science and lived experience. This progressivist vision owes much to the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries, without necessarily denying the existence of God or of some divine force that may have brought about this world eons away in time.

There is also a pure secularist world view exemplified by the neo-atheists. Their reaction to religion is to see it as essentially fundamentalist, and generally more harmful than helpful. They find no evidence for the existence of a God or divine force, and often portray religion as the source of the world's evils. They are comfortable with science, reason and lived experience as a basis for building a livable world.

Those who affirm a faith in science as being able to inform us about some kinds of truths or ways of knowing, and also a faith in religion as being able to provide us some knowledge or understanding based on different sources of knowledge or declarations of what is true or real, may be said to be both secular and religious.

Sociologists continue to benefit from and build on the works of the great founders, especially Durkheim and Weber. Nowhere is the struggle between the sacred and the secular, between traditionalism and rationality more visible than it is in the United States. Thus, we find at the beginning of the 21st century that a significant number of Americans believe in creationism and the

inerrancy of the Bible, and deny evolution or reduce it to a kind of speculative theory. A Pew study found that 42 percent of Americans believe that life on earth has existed in its present form from the beginning of time (some 6000 years ago), while 48 percent believe it evolved over millions of years. Sixty four percent favored teaching creationism along with evolution in school, while 26 percent opposed it. Thirty eight percent believed creationism should be taught instead of evolution while 49 percent opposed it (Pew Aug. 30, 2005).

Sociology of Religion as a Discipline at the Beginning of the 21st Century

Post-modern scholars have critiqued the worldview of the enlightenment, arguing for a movement away from the dichotomies it constructed, between traditional religion and modern rational secularism, and toward the possibility of more collaborative worldviews and relationships, where rationality and religion co-exist. For example there could be less stress on the autonomous individual and more on the relationship between the individual and the collectivity. Feminist theory also stressed the importance of being in relationships (Neitz 2004, 391–402). For the sociology of religion this suggests an approach that focuses not only on beliefs and institutions but on the lived experience of religion (Orsi 2002). Religious identity is revealed in what people practice and how they live in the day to day as well as in what they profess.

There is a growing interest in religions and their relationships with other social institutions. This has contributed to the strengthening of the sociology of religion (Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Religion is less frequently displayed as a dependent variable, shaped by other forces, and more frequently as an independent variable with causal impact (Smile 2010). Global consciousness has affected the sociology of religion leading some to call for a discipline that is less parochial, transcending assumptions that view the religious structures in the USA and the range of Christian forms practiced there as normative (Poulson and Campbell 2010). Current studies challenge the preference that has been given to studies of Christian, institutionally bound religions (Poulson and Campbell 2010; Smilde and May 2010). Some scholars also argue that the sociology of religion must critically engage religions, identifying both the positive and negative effects of religion.

Globalization and the emergence of the millennial generation call for scholars to question taken for granted assumptions about what constitutes religion and its practices. The institution-bound, congregationally centered model is giving way to other religious forms. It is of paramount importance that the measures used to study religious practices embrace a wider range of expressions and languages. We need research that will help us discern and distinguish between the social movements within the world's major religions. Sociological methods and measures must be reexamined in order to respond to changes in spiritual and religious attitudes and practices. Conservative paradigms defining religious orthodoxy by measures such as church attendance and biblical literalism must be interrogated.

We close our essay with an example of the kind of research on religion that puts sociology front and center in tackling issues of local, national, and global significance. Skirbekk, Kaufmann, and Goujon (2010), connect population trends to religious identity, with the following conclusion:

> If fertility and migration trends [in the USA] continue, Hispanic Catholics will experience rapid growth and expand from 10 to 18 percent of the American population between 2003 and 2043. Protestants are projected to decrease from 47 percent to 39 percent over the same period, while Catholicism emerges as the largest religion among the youngest age cohorts. Liberal Protestants decline relative to other groups due to lower fertility and losses from religious switching. Immigration drives growth among Hindus and Muslims, while low fertility and a mature age structure causes Jewish decline. The low fertility of secular Americans and the religiosity of immigrants provide a countervailing force to secularization, causing the non-religious population share to peak before 2043. (293)

The relevance of this kind of research to areas of the world marked by high levels of in and out migration, with different religious and fertility patterns, should be obvious. The next 30 years may be a better indicator of a large society's ability to become a melting pot of ethnic, racial and religious beliefs and practices than was true of the period from 1879 to 1970.

Sociologists of religion bring to the table a discipline with methods and theories that seem now more mature and balanced than was possible a century ago. As the public and scholars from sociology and other disciplines recognize the role

that religion plays at all levels of social life, we can expect the continuing expansion of this field.

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